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Optimal Pricing Policy of Continental Transit Route: A Study of Kolkata-
Agartala Transit Route 
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to investigate the pricing policy of transhipment route for 
India to move cargo through Bangladesh from Kolkata port to the capital city of Tripura i.e. 
Agartala. Initially, Bangladesh was hesitating to allow India to provide transhipment facility for 
the north eastern region but India reciprocate it in right direction by providing similar facility to 
Bangladesh to reach the Himalayan landlocked countries like Nepal and Bhutan, thereby, 
actively participate in moving towards an integrated transport network for this region as a 
whole. The future opening of Myanmar route further gives some relief to India. Most of the cargo 
originates from Kolkata (Port) and terminates at Guwahati and distributed to various 
destinations of north eastern states. We try to investigate the pricing policy of such transhipment 
route for India in terms of a Bertrand type model with non homogeneous type cargo movement 
where the unit price of cargo transhipment taken as a proxy for such transhipment route. 
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1. Introduction:  
Before partition
1
, Tripura was very much connected with India‟s hinterland both by roads and 
railways through the then East Bengal (presently known as Bangladesh). So, no need was felt to 
connect Tripura with the rest of the states in the northeast
2
. But the partition made Tripura an 
extreme outpost not only from the heartland of India but also from the north eastern region, too. 
After partition, Tripura emerged as a mirror image of the whole north eastern region 
encompassed with ethno-geographic and bio-geographic location. It was land locked- an outpost 
away from the remaining parts of the country, only connected by tenuous Churaibari corridor. 
Though it shared some boundary with neighouring Mizoram in the eastern part but smooth 
transportation was not possible due to the presence of Jampui Hills in Mizoram state border. The 
remaining boundary is covered by Bangladesh in the whole Western, Southern and maximum 
                                                          
1
 In 1947, August 15, India got independence and bifurcated as India and Pakistan. At that time, Tripura was a 
Princely state and formally integrated with India on October 15, 1949.  
 
2
 The North Eastern region comprises of seven states viz. Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Manipur, 
Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura (known as Seven Sisters). Recently, Sikkim is also incorporated into this region. 
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portion of the Eastern side. Hence, the immediate need was to connect Tripura with the north 
eastern region. Assam-Agartala road (National Highway-44) project via Churaibari was found to 
be the only economically viable project. The central government constructed the Assam-Agartala 
road through the hilly region. As a result, a well-connected native state became an isolated land 
locked region with its immense geo-strategic importance in the face of political tension between 
India and Pakistan. Against this background, Tripura is constantly facing the problem of a lack 
of a smooth transportation and naturally, it is an economic imperative for this landlocked state to 
seek benefits for itself through greater regional integration. Development of the State requires the 
existence of viable road network in Tripura so that the transport cost for both inflows and 
outflows of commodities from Tripura will be cheaper. The State Government of Tripura is 
continuously demanding for transit route through Bangladesh but they are not ready to 
implement this because of possible threat of loss. So, the debate on the possibility of a viable 
road network is relevant for economic progress of the state. 
However, it is a fact that the Asian highway project has not covered directly three states of the 
north eastern region – Tripura is one of them. But the existing Roadway link may fetch the 
advantage of Asian Highway in accelerating its activity in border trade with countries like China. 
Moreover, the Asian Highway project may be used more effectively if the demand of Tripura for 
using the sea port in Bangladesh is granted. The entire trade situation is likely to be changed as a 
result. Tripura is likely to be the gateway for Tran‟s border trade not only for India but also for 
Bangladesh, too. 
The area of research which is proposed here is basically an attempt to explore the possibilities of 
a viable road network which can respond to the demand for communication by people of Tripura 
as well as the demand of Tripura‟s projected economy. It requires no mention that Tripura is 
geographically a sequester land located at the remotest corner of the Country where 
transportation is relatively a time consuming phenomenon. The north eastern region is connected 
by land with the rest of India through West Bengal. The surface transport system for movement 
of cargo/passengers to and from the north eastern states consists of road, rail and waterways. As 
far as cargo movement is concerned, most of the cargo originates from Kolkata (Port) and 
terminates at Guwahati and vice-versa. From Guwahati, the cargo gets distributed to various 
destinations of north eastern states. The transport links to states particularly Mizoram, Tripura, 
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Manipur and Nagaland are affected many a time by floods, landslides, blockages of roads and 
local agitations. Apart from that, the stretches and curves of roads in the hilly area does not 
permit smooth and feasible cargo services in this region. Perhaps, the best example is the Natural 
Gas based Palatana
3
 Power plant which is yet to wait some more time, as the present road 
network within Tripura is not capable of carrying the required machinery of that project. 
Government of India was seeking permission from the Bangladesh Government to allow their 
roads for this purpose. Ultimately, in December 2010, a Memorandum of Understanding has 
been signed between India and Bangladesh to tranship the required heavy machinery through the 
sea and land route of the latter in phased manner. 
The main objectives of this paper is to investigate the pricing policy of transit route for India to 
move cargo through Bangladesh from Kolkata port to the capital city of Tripura i.e. Agartala 
keeping in mind the advantage and disadvantage of the existing road network in Tripura as well 
as future opening of Myanmar route as an alternative transit route via Mizoram state border for 
north eastern region in general and Tripura, in particular.  As such, no such significant work has 
been found with particular reference to this type of problem for a less developed and 
geographically sequesters state like Tripura in the Indian context. Hope, this proposed paper will 
attempt to fill up that caveat. 
2. Review of Literature:  
Study of the available literature suggests that the effect of transportation investment on economic 
development comes from the role of transportation facilities in enabling movement and 
interchange of activities between different locations. The earliest works in regional science 
recognized that both growth and concentration of economic activity at any given location 
depends largely on access to markets and the location economies arising out of that access. This 
is reflected in the works of Marshall (1919) who explained the need for transportation for 
enhancing economic growth in terms of economies of scale of production where as Weber 
(1929) tried to explain this interface in the line of Marshall through the concept of agglomeration 
of different stages of production. On the other hand, central place development theory was 
                                                          
3
 Palatana Power Project is situated near Udaipur, the district head quarter of South Tripura, approximately 60 KM 
away from Agartala, the Capital City of Tripura. 
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propounded by Christaller (1933). Recently, Weisbrod (2007) explained this in terms of a 
business decision-making perspective and identify the mechanisms whereby transportation can 
affect supplier and buyer markets and costs, affecting the pattern and magnitude of economic 
growth among various industries and locations. Further, Economic development of any society is 
a complex process, which depends on several interacting forces. Perhaps one of the most 
important of these forces is the provision of adequate transport infrastructures. This is 
particularly true in the largely subsistence economy of most Asian and African countries where 
transport constitutes the key to development especially at the early stages of economic advance. 
Stuckey (1973) argued that transport facilitated economic advancement and transport 
improvement was indeed part of the economic advancement. A certain percentage of the 
economic activities arose directly because of new transport possibilities but for the most part, 
new transport facilities enabled the expansion of local activity and the integration of previously 
isolated market. In the same line, Filani (1978) observed that the socio-economic development of 
any society depends on a large extent to the nature and structure of transportation network of the 
society. He also argued that transportation provides the arteries through which the economic life-
stream of society flows-the people, information, raw materials and finished products which help 
to build and maintain the society. However, no society can exist above the subsistence level 
without a measure of improvement in its transport system.  
In a review of Transport Strategy of the World Bank (2001); Venter et al (2003) and Maunder et 
al (2004) recognize the need to address more systematically access issues, especially for those 
who are mobility impaired. This is particularly the case for most of the Land Locked
4
 countries 
who do not have any sea cost. As a result, in order to trade with the rest of the world, these 
countries must depend on the neighouring one or more countries for transit to reach the sea.  
Arvis et al (2007) has pointed out that at present, about one out of five countries in the world is 
landlocked. The problem mostly affects the poorest countries: 20 out of 54 low-income 
economies are landlocked, with a majority of them in Sub- Saharan Africa; while only three 
high-income economies out of 35 are landlocked. Arvis et al further pointed out that nine of the 
                                                          
4
 Actually, there are 42 landlocked countries in the world today. Except for the relatively wealthy landlocked states 
in Western and Central Europe (for example, Switzerland, Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia), the 
rest are all poor and 31 landlocked countries can accurately be classified as LLDCs. Sixteen of the LLDCs are also 
categorized as least developed countries (LDCs). In SAARC region, there are three LLDCs: Afghanistan, Nepal and 
Bhutan.  
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twelve countries ranked lowest on the 2002 Human Development Index are landlocked. 
Although landlocked developing countries represent 12.5 per cent of the world's land area and 4 
per cent of the global population, their combined gross domestic product accounts for only 0.3 
per cent of the total. Without direct access to the oceans, these countries must pay an average of 
15 per cent of export earnings on transport; for some African countries it is as high as 50 per 
cent, other developing countries spend only 7 percent on such services and developed countries 4 
per cent. The case of landlocked developing countries has naturally received special attention, 
including a specific set of development priorities which was reflected in the Almaty Conference 
(2003). 
Variants of the new economic geography, new trade theory, neoclassical and endogenous growth 
theories have been applied to highlight the nexus between geographic location, trade and 
economic growth. Amjadi and Yeats (1995) point out that the incidence of transport costs fall 
heavily on the landlocked African countries since they have to adjust their selling price to world 
prices. Bloom and Williamson (1997) highlighted that the land locked countries are always 
experienced a weaker growth as compared to the other maritime developing countries. 
According to their estimates, sometimes it is reduced by 1.5% points as compared to the later 
which again supported by the study of MacKellar et al (2002). Therefore, landlockedness can be 
thought as raising import prices and reducing export revenues. It is one reason why Radelet and 
Sachs (1998) advocate the idea that a re-export model is extremely difficult to achieve in 
landlocked developing countries due to higher cost of intermediate products. Gallup, Sachs and 
Mellinger (1999) identified two reasons behind the disadvantaged position of landlocked 
countries which may be stated as: (i) Coastal countries may have military or economic incentives 
to impose costs on landlocked countries; and (ii) Infrastructure development across national 
borders is more difficult to arrange than similar investments within a country.  
Limao and Venables (2001) estimate that the landlocked countries trade on average 30% less 
than coastal countries. In this context, MacKellar et al. (2002) explain the negative relationship 
between landlockedness and growth using a neoclassical theory. They highlight that crossing a 
border implies higher transaction costs due to customs and handling costs.  
Dependence over the transit state necessarily implies high transaction costs (notably 
transportation costs). In this regard, UNCTAD (2002) identified the “Transit charges” like port 
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charges, road tolls, forwarding fees, customs bonds or transport quota restrictions. Hence, the 
impact of being landlocked is based on the idea of dependence over the transit state. It has 
produced two main corollaries: Firstly, dependence necessarily implies high transaction costs 
and Secondly, mitigating measures for landlocked countries which again leads to either adopting 
transit rules recognized by the international law or developing regional transport infrastructure. 
While there is a consensus on the problems of landlocked countries, the analysis so far has 
mainly focused on their transport cost disadvantage. Transport costs however account for only 
part of the real cost of being landlocked as they do not account for the transit delays and 
unpredictability which are critical in international trade. In the literature, macro-data are usually 
used to estimate the transportation costs burden. Radelet and Sachs (1998) find these costs to be 
about 50% higher for landlocked countries. Stone (2001) using the ratio of „freight payments as 
percent of total imports‟ shows that landlocked developing countries, especially in Africa, bear 
exorbitant transport costs: out of 15 landlocked African countries, 13 had a ratio higher than 10% 
and for 7 the ratio was even higher at 20% as compared with 4.7% for industrial countries and 
2.2% for the US.  However, Arvis (2007) questioned about the notion that costs of transportation 
supported by developing countries are intrinsically high. Neither the distance covered, nor the 
unit cost of transportation services, are necessarily much higher in landlocked developing 
countries than in the wealthiest countries. Yet there are significant variations; for instance, 
Central and East Africa have higher unit costs than the EU but this is not the case of South and 
East Asia or other sub-regions in Africa. Furthermore, transportation costs only explain one part 
of the real impact of being landlocked. Delays and even more importantly low degree of 
reliability and predictability of services create massive disincentives to invest and higher total 
logistics costs. Moreover, Arvis et al demonstrated in that study that the gap between landlocked 
countries and gateway countries may not be very high – if transport cost is the only parameter 
taken into account. Shippers in most African gateway countries already face high logistics costs 
when adding maritime transport, port charges (which can be ten times higher in some African 
ports as compared to ports in developed countries), and domestic transport (especially to/from 
remote areas, as is the case for several export crops). In Africa, many shippers in landlocked 
developing countries have the same charges to move goods from/to ports as shippers in the 
gateway country.   
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In order to remove the disparity of transportation facility among the member countries, 
particularly for the landlocked developing countries, Article V of the GATT 1994 (Freedom of 
Transit) provides for the freedom of transit of goods, vessels and other means of transport across 
the territory of WTO Members via the routes most convenient for international transit, without 
distinguishing between flag of vessel, origin, departure, entry, exit, destination, or ownership of 
the goods, vessels or other means of transport involved.  
Freedom of transit and a viable Customs transit regime for international transit are both 
particularly important for landlocked developing countries, many of which are among the 
poorest of the developing countries with the weakest growth rates, and typically dependent on 
commodity exports or imports of intermediate goods. In this context, the Almaty Conference in 
August 2003 drew attention to the problem of transit for these countries and devised an action 
programme. Customs transit regimes usually tend to suffer from the same shortcomings as other 
Customs transactions. These include the lack of simplified and standardized Customs 
procedures, documents and data processing, publication of fees and charges, cooperation among 
national Customs authorities, adequate security measures to combat fraud and smuggling, risk 
management techniques, computerization and electronic messaging. Inadequate transport 
infrastructure, logistics, vehicle standards and container seals add to these problems.  
However, to confirm smooth transportation from the gateway country to the landlocked one, 
transhipment instead of transit is a better alternative in reducing the extent of custom procedure 
as well as related data work. Since, Transhipments refers to the same inter-country passage using 
gateway country-owned transportation, whereas in transit, landlocked country –owned surface 
transport move through the transit from one end to the other. For example, Germany or Austria 
sends goods to Italy through Switzerland. Another instance of transit, Alaska dispatches goods to 
mainland US through Canada. 
While the basic obligations in Article V aim at ensuring optimal conditions for transit, there are 
indications that, on the ground, real freedom of transit is often absent or compromised. The 
conditions of international trade and the requirements for transit have changed since Article V 
was originally formulated in the late 1940s, and comments from business, international 
organizations and WTO members, in particular developing ones, have suggested a number of 
obstacles and shortcomings in relation to transit.  
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This study shall attempt to enrich the existing literature by considering the pricing policy of 
transit route for land locked developing countries particularly for those counties which have 
more than one feasible transit gateway through the neighouring countries. 
 
3. India-Bangladesh Relation and the Issue of Transit/Transhipments Route for North 
Eastern Region: 
As mentioned earlier, partition makes the whole north eastern India a partially landlocked region. 
In real sense, it cannot be defined as a landlocked region. However, the chicken neck shaped 
geographic location coupled with the presence of hilly terrain across the region makes this a 
partially isolated region from its heartland. A tiny hilly state like Tripura always lies below the 
National growth rate of State Domestic Product. There may be several reasons behind this 
underdevelopment but, undoubtedly, lack of proper communication with the rest of the country 
as well as with the neighbouring north eastern states aggravates the problem. This may be 
identified as a pseudo landlocked region where being a part of the Indian territory this particular 
state is not landlocked in true sense but the feasible road distance from the nearest sea port i.e. 
Kolkata port is more than four times the Arial distance from the same, ultimately, makes this 
state economically landlocked. 
Against this backdrop, the state Government of Tripura is continuously demanding the transit 
route through Bangladesh for inflow and outflow of Commodities from its heartland but they 
were not ready to do this because of possible threat of loss.  Apart from this a debate has been 
raging in Bangladesh on whether transit facilities should be given to India or not through the land 
territory of Bangladesh. The main reason behind this debate is more of political in nature than 
that of pure economic logic. Some argue that what India is demanding is some kind of rights on 
the territory of Bangladesh to move goods and people from the western part of India to its 
landlocked north eastern region and hence, they try to solve some of the core bilateral issues with 
India before giving this type of facility. The other groups are advocating this transit issue as an 
economic issue for trade facilitation and should not be politicized. Whatever be the view, it is 
fact that transit issue is a complex one and multi-faceted issue. The ambiguity arises due to two 
concepts: corridor versus transit. In the corridor, a country gives some kind of rights or control 
on the land to the other country making it a defacto of its territory, while in transit there is no 
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question of rights involved in the land territory allowed for transit. It provides only transit 
facilities under certain conditions and can be withdrawn. On the other hand, transit, an inter-
country passage (like waterway-transit already provided to India since 1972), where India wants 
to dispatch goods and other materials from western parts of India to its seven land-locked north 
eastern states through Bangladesh and no kind of rights exists on the land territory of 
Bangladesh. 
 
3.1 Bilateral vis-à-vis Continental Transit Issues: 
Geographically, Bangladesh has some natural monopoly in this particular issue. Now the 
question is why Bangladesh was reluctant to permit such facilities to India. Being the natural 
monopolist in this particular issue, it tried to solve some basic bilateral issues with India. Two 
major bilateral issues can be identified in this case. Firstly, it wants similar transit facilities from 
India to access Nepal and Bhutan. These landlocked Himalayan countries are geographically 
quite close to Bangladesh but they are surrounded by India. Nepal and Bangladesh are separated 
by a narrow piece of Indian Territory of about 15 kilometres in the southeast. Had there been 
transit facilities (Nepal-India- Bangladesh), landlocked Nepal (so is Bhutan) could use 
Chittagong and Mongla port of Bangladesh that could cut down its transportation cost 
dramatically and one could see better trade and tourism relations between these two countries. 
Secondly, Bangladesh‟s export to India accounts for less than seven percent of its total import 
from the latter. As a result, it has a massive trade deficit with India. Moreover, large volumes of 
informal imports from India cross the land border avoiding Bangladesh import duties. There are 
allegations from Bangladesh that its products often face India‟s non-tariff barriers and other 
bureaucratic hurdles. But the Trade Complementarity Index shows that trade complementarity 
between Bangladesh and India is very low (5.42). This is due to less diversified export basket of 
Bangladesh for India as well as the later country is highly concentrated on readymade garment 
product which is not a significant import item for India. On the other hand, India has a broad 
export basket and close geographical proximity which, in turn, has helped Bangladesh to source 
for many commodities and final products with comparatively cheaper price. Hence, until and 
unless these complementarity issues are not overcome, it is hardly possible for Bangladesh to 
redress such imbalances. Though, in recent years, trade barriers have declined, both in 
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Bangladesh and India, in line with their commitments to World Trade Organization and South 
Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA). Moreover, India has given preferences to 
Bangladesh on approximately 2,925 tariff lines under SAPTA.  However, these two bilateral 
issues have already been solved through a bilateral treaty between them. 
From the above analysis, it seems that Bangladesh was not fully reluctant to allow India to use its 
territory to access northeast India but what it wants is a continental transit facility, especially in 
the southern part of the SAARC region (Bangladesh-India-Nepal-Bhutan) which does make 
more economic sense. The deadlock on transit issues has been costing India and Bangladesh‟s 
transport and other communication links. There is an overwhelming consensus that, to integrate 
South Asia with southeast- and other parts of Asia, there is a need for greater transport network 
across Asia. But India and Bangladesh have significant differences on the selection of the Asian 
Highway Network (AHN). Bangladesh opposes the proposed route (India-Bangladesh portion) 
that enters into Bangladesh from India and goes back into India. Bangladesh wants to initiate a 
route that connects it with Southeast Asia as well going through Chittagong and Myanmar, as the 
proposed route, as it argues, will virtually become a transit route for Indian goods between rest of 
India and northeast India. For this, Islam S (2010) commented that Bangladesh always tried to 
maintain this natural monopoly situation in order to solve all its bilateral issues with India in a 
single package. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why the tripartite gas pipeline project 
(Myanmar-Bangladesh-India) had not implemented finally.  
Here, Bangladesh is always contemplating the transhipment/transit issues with Nepal and Bhutan 
but Myanmar was not ready to accept the proposed AHN route through Myanmar-Bangladesh-
India route rather they are more interested to propose this route in Myanmar-North Eastern India-
Bangladesh-India line. Once, the role of Myanmar is incorporated in this game, the relative 
advantage of Bangladesh will turn into potential disadvantage when the later are not ready to 
provide transit/transhipment facility for north eastern region of India. Another, major issue in 
this context is to determine the pricing of such transit/transhipment route. Since, transporter 
country India will utilise the transport infrastructure of Bangladesh, India has to pay the requisite 
fees or in other words, how much price Bangladesh can charge at most to provide such transit/ 
transhipment facility through its own territory.  To answer these questions, we consider the 
following model to determine the optimal pricing of such route in the situations: (1) Bangladesh 
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Route is the only available alternative; and (2) Myanmar is also interested in providing 
transit/transhipment facility to India for its North Eastern region.  
 
4. Model:  
When the Myanmar Route for transit/transhipment was not available, the Transit/Transhipments 
Route through Bangladesh was the only available alternative to avoid the staggering transport 
cost to ship the commodities from hinterland to its north eastern counterpart. Obviously, in the 
absence of a land transit link between India and Bangladesh, the traffic between Kolkata and 
Assam is mainly carried by rail and road links through the Siliguri Corridor and the 
requirements of additional transport costs for carrying goods is staggering. To transport goods to 
and from the northeast through the corridor, the Indian government provides 25 percent transport 
subsidy. It is estimated that seven billion Rupees are being spent as additional costs to transport 
goods and services to and from northeast India. The figure is estimated in 1990s and it is 
expected that the cost has increased in tandem with economic growth both in northeast India and 
the rest of India. As such, as a transit route through Bangladesh can integrate the northeast India 
with its mainland and is set to reduce transportation cost significantly. In order to alleviate this 
problem effectively, evaluation studies must be performed in order to invest limited resources for 
maximum social benefits.  
Assumptions: Four fundamental assumptions are made in this model: 
(1) Here, Transhipment route itself is treated as tradable commodity; 
(2) Amount of Transhipment is measured in terms of total amount of cargo movement from 
Kolkata port to Agartala during that period;  
(3) The transit/transhipment proving countries are non-cooperative in nature; and 
(4) All cargo may not be homogeneous. 
The last assumption needs to be explained in detail. Apart from providing transit route through 
their own territory, both the gateway countries have some export basket for India. Hence, any 
cargo containing readymade garments originating from Kolkata port towards Agartala can hardly 
get any passage through Bangladesh because this item is one of the most important exportable 
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items for Bangladesh. But the same cargo can easily reach Agartala through Myanmar route. 
Similarly, any cargo containing rice can hardly expect to get passage through Myanmar though it 
can reach Agartala via Bangladesh. In this sense, it is assumed that all cargos are not 
homogeneous.  
Notations:  
tjI: Actual Average transportation cost per unit from Kolkata Port to Guwahati at par with the all 
India level; 
tjB: Average transportation cost per unit from Kolkata Port to Agartala via Bangladesh Route; 
tjM: Average transportation cost per unit from Kolkata Port to Agartala via Myanmar Route; and 
tjA: Actual Average transportation cost per unit  from Guwahati to Agartala via the existing 
Route; 
𝑋𝑗: be the total unit of cargo to be transhipped. 
Further, we assume that (tjI, tjB, tjM) < tjA. Otherwise, the issue of transit or transhipment 
through the neighouring counties will not arise. 
But, tjB>=< tjM   
It may be noted that the normal transportation cost is assumed to be included in the cost schedule 
in contemporary economic literature. Hence, if the producer operates under break even situation 
then they hardly find any inducement to sell their products beyond Guwahati market due to this 
extra cost burden above its normal level. Simply, due to this adverse geographical locational 
problem, the transport subsidy for this region is staggering.        
If, T
i
 be Total Transportation Cost to Agartala from Kolkata port via i
th
 Route; for all i= I, B and 
M. accordingly, the total transhipment costs to Agartala through the alternative routes are as 
following: 
T
A
 =   tjA + tjI . Xj𝑛𝑗=1  + 0 > 0---------------------------------------------------------------Equation (1) 
T
B 
=  tjB. Xj 𝑛𝑗=1 > 0-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Equation (2) 
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T
M
 =  tjM. Xj 𝑛𝑗=1 > 0----------------------------------------------------------------------------Equation (3) 
From where, assuming T
A
 be the upper limit of total transport cost to Agartala from Kolkata Port 
through conventional route, the net gains from providing transhipment facility to Agartala may 
be written as: 
Net gains for Bangladesh = T
A
 – TB =   tjA + tjI –  tjB . xj𝑛𝑗=1 --------------------------Equation (4) 
Net gains for Myanmar    = T
A
- T
M
 =   tjA + tjI −  tjM . xj𝑛𝑗=1 --------------------------Equation (5) 
The right hand sides show the individual net actual gains beyond its normal level from providing 
transhipment facility to Agartala by the Country through which the transhipment takes place.  
Hence, tjB>=< tjM     tjA + tjI –  tjB .
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗 < = >  (tjA + tjI −  tjM)Xj
𝑛
𝑗=1 ------Equation (6) 
Moreover, it may be noted that from Equations (1) and (4), 
T
A
 =   tjA + tjI . Xj𝑛𝑗=1  
Or, T
A
 =   tjA + tjI + tjB − tjB . Xj𝑛𝑗=1  
Or, T
A
 =  tjB. xj + 𝑛𝑗=1    tjI − tjB . xj +   tjA. xj 
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑗=1 --------------------------------Equation (7) 
Similarly, from Equations (1) and (5), 
T
A
 =  tjM. xj + 𝑛𝑗=1    tjI − tjM . xj +   tjA. xj 
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑗=1 ------------------------------------Equation (8) 
i.e.                                                                                  [Actual cost of Transhipments Though Foreign Country]  
  +                             
[Actual Transportation Cost to Agartala] =                   [Net Loss Due to Intra Regional Strategic disadvantage] 
                                       +                                                                                                      
                                                                                         [Net Loss Due to Inter Regional Strategic disadvantage] 
 
This has been depicted in the following figure showing the alternative routes. 
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Case1: Bangladesh alone provides Transhipments Facility for Agartala 
The Demand function for cargo through the Bangladesh transit route may be considered as:  
𝑡𝑗𝐵 = 𝐵 − 𝑏. 𝑋𝑗----------------------------------------------------------------------------------Equation (9) 
Where B>0 is the intercept and b>0 is the slope coefficient of the demand function thereby 
confirming the negatively sloped demand curve. 
The Cost structure may be considered as: CB= Fb-C1. 𝑋𝑗--------------------------------Equation (10) 
Where again, F>o denotes the Fixed cost and C denotes the Marginal Cost 
Hence, under monopoly situation, 𝑋𝑗 ∗= 
𝐵−𝐶1
2𝑏
-------------------------------------------Equation (11a) 
Accordingly, 𝑡𝑗𝐵 ∗= 𝐵 − 𝐶1. 𝑋𝑗 ∗---------------------------------------------------------Equation (11b) 
Hence, equilibrium may be achieved by equating Equations (7) and Equation (8), 
Case2: Transit through Myanmar is also possible (Case of Differentiated Bertrand 
Competition) 
We retain the same demand function with 𝑋𝑗 = 𝑋𝑗𝐵 + 𝑋𝑗𝑀. Hence the demand fuction appears 
to be:  
For Bangladesh: 𝑡𝑗𝐵 = 𝐴1 − 𝑎1. 𝑡𝑗𝐵 + 𝑏1. 𝑡𝑗𝑀-----------------------------------------Equation (12a) 
For Myanmar: 𝑡𝑗𝐵 = 𝐴2 − 𝑎2. 𝑡𝑗𝑀 + 𝑏2. 𝑡𝑗𝐵-------------------------------------------Equation (12b) 
Where (A1,A2)>0 are the intercepts term and a1,a2.b1,b2)>0 are the slope coefficients of the 
demand functions thereby confirming the negatively sloped demand curves for each country. 
Accordingly, the cost functions may be assumed as: 
For Bangladesh: CB= Fb-C1. 𝑋𝑗𝐵-----------------------------------------------------------Equation (13a) 
For Myanmar: CM= Fm-C2. 𝑋𝑗M------------------------------------------------------------Equation (13b) 
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Similarly, Where again, F>o denotes the Fixed cost and C denotes the Marginal Cost, 
respectively, for each country. 
Under non-cooperative type situation, the optimal amount of transshipment through different 
routes found to be as following: 
tjB**= 
2 𝐴1−𝐶1 𝑎2+ 𝐴2−𝐶2 𝑏2
4𝑎1𝑎2−𝑏1𝑏2
 and tjM**= 
2 𝐴2−𝐶2 𝑎1+ 𝐴1−𝐶1 𝑏1
4𝑎1𝑎2−𝑏1𝑏2
 -------------------------Equation (14) 
From these, we can calculate, XjB**and XjM**------------------------------------------Equation (15) 
From the above analysis, it is clear that, transit/ transhipment facility cannot solve the whole 
transport disadvantage for India. But, under continental transhipment, India can substantially 
reduce its inter regional disadvantage substantially and there is a possibility that the intra 
regional loss will also reduce from its present level. Transhipment alone cannot solve the 
staggering transportation cost burden but undoubtedly, the extent will reduce from its present 
level. Simultaneously, the transhipment providing countries like Bangladesh and Myanmar will 
gain significantly in terms of derived demand of Transport infrastructure and allied sectors. 
Further, this continental transport network can lead towards integrated transport network for this 
region. 
 
 
 5. Conclusion:  
Though Bangladesh is suffering from mounted trade deficit with India but a close look towards 
its deficit component clearly shows that it is net importer in multiple dimensions so far as the 
western side is considered. At the same time, it is a net exporter to India if its trade statistics is 
considered, it enjoys trade surplus with the north eastern region. Due to this strategic advantage, 
Bangladesh has some specific interest for trade with this region. Initially, Bangladesh was 
hesitating to allow India to provide transhipment facility for the north eastern region but India 
reciprocate it in right direction by providing similar transit facility to Bangladesh to reach the 
Himalayan landlocked countries like Nepal and Bhutan, thereby, actively participate in moving 
towards an integrated transport network for this region as a whole. Opening of Myanmar route 
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further gives India some relief in term reduced transportation cost due to both inter and intra 
regional disadvantage for the landlocked state like Tripura. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix: Map of the Transhipment Route from Kolkata Port to AgartalaNote:N 
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Note: The Transhipment route is prepared on the basis of route map of Asian Highway Network  
in Bangladesh. 
